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Abstract 
 
This paper takes its departure from the seeming condemnation and relegation of philosophy 
into the dustbin of irrelevance in some quarters. This mood gains credence from the activities 
of philosophers themselves who seem contended in hiding themselves in their philosophical 
cubicles  while  they  are  detached  from  issues  of  practical  concern  to  non-spatio-temporal 
realities. In Dewey, however, there is a paradigm shift from the status quo. Dewey emphasizes 
the need to hijack philosophy from redundancy back to the realm of functionality where it 
actually  belongs.    The  paper  thus  concludes  that  the  tendency  towards  reconstruction  is 
ultimately needed in philosophy in order to return it to a centre stage of relevance. 
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Introduction 
 
John Dewey, born in Burlington, Vermont, was regarded as a genius because his revolutionary 
works dominated philosophy and education throughout the first part of the twentieth century. 
He was and remains America’s most famous philosopher. Before his death, he had written over 
forty books and seven hundred articles. Some of these books are: Reconstruction in Philosophy 
(1920); The School and the Society (1899). My Pedagogic Creed (1897); How we Think (1933); 
Moral  Principles  in  Education  (1909);  Democracy  and  Education  (1916);  Experience  and 
Education  (1938);  Schools  of  Tomorrow  (1915)  and  several  other  books  which  cut  across 
politics, ethics, psychology, biology, theology, and virtually, all aspects of life. He was simply a 
colossus!  Dewey’s  efforts  were  principally  geared  towards  revamping  philosophy  from  the 
shackles  of  irrelevance.  His  entire  philosophy  centers  around  reconstructionism.  He 
preoccupied  himself  with  reconstructing  the  meaning  of  philosophy,  of  experience,  of 
knowledge, of education, of the society, and even of meaning itself. Without much ado, let us 
begin to consider Dewey in his act of reconstruction.  
 
Reconstructing Philosophy 
 
Dewey was dissatisfied with the notion and mode of philosophizing from the ancient period 
down  to  the  modern  period.  He  classified  this  form  of  philosophy  traditional,  as  it  stands     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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antithetical to a new kind of philosophy he was trying to introduce alongside other pragmatists. 
To  justify  and  substantiate  the  difference,  Dewey  got  involved  in  philosophizing  about 
philosophy itself – metaphilosophy. One could paraphrase him posing such questions as: What 
does  it  really  mean  to  philosophies?  what  makes  philosophy  a  philosophy?.  How  do 
philosophers philosophies? What should be the ideal concern of philosophy? et cetera. These 
questions,  bordering  on  metaphilosophy,  became  necessary  given  the  influences  and 
orientation  from  Darwinism  and  pragmatism  as  introduced  by  Pierce  and  Williams.  Dewey 
observed that philosophy, from the time of Plato, had assumed an utter detachment from the 
world around. This detachment is traceable to the dualism deeply entrenched in the writings of 
ancient scholars. Beginning with Plato, one finds a bifurcation of two separate worlds which 
have nothing in common. The first world is the spatio-temporal world which is replete with 
frivolities and decay, and thus, corrupt and unintelligible (Talisse, 2000:25). The second is a 
non-spatio-temporal  world,  technically  tagged  the  ‘world  of  ideas,’  which  is  populated  by 
abstract  entities  called  ‘forms’.  These  forms  are  comprehended  only  by  reason  which 
bequeaths true knowledge on a thinker through a total withdrawal from the world of physical 
existence {the first world}. This kind of dualism is reincarnated in Aristotle’s Form and Matter; 
Augustine’s City of God and City of Man; Descartes’ Mind and Body distinction; Kant’s Noumena 
and Phenomena; and others. These scholars have been involved in theorizing around one form 
of dualism or the other. 
 
These efforts, however, have resulted in several problems that were not solved and remain 
unsolved. Basic among the problem was how to foster a relationship or a connection between 
the  dualisms  created.  These  seeming  problems,  as  it  were,  are  not  problems  in  the  first 
instance. The desire to create problems where there are no problems, have been the reason for 
the  perceived  redundancy  of  philosophy  by  people.  Another  problem  associated  with  this 
philosophy of dualism is its tendency to get philosophers detached from the physical world. If 
the ‘world of forms’ or the ‘city of God’ is eternal, ideal, unchanging and perfect world, while 
the physical world is the world of shadows, mundane and temporal, then it makes sense to get 
detached from the later, in order to focus on the former. Thus, philosophy became a form of 
detached thinking from the physical realm, with utmost focus on the metaphysical realm. In 
doing this, it arrogates itself above all other disciplines, for the reason that while the latter 
concerns itself with realities of the physical world, philosophy studies a ‘higher’ kind of reality 
which by their very nature, are superior to the supposed reality in the spatio-temporal world.  
In Dewey’s words; 
“Philosophy  has  arrogated  to  itself  the  office  of  demonstrating  the 
existence of a transcendent, absolute or inner reality and of revealing to 
man  the  nature  and  features  of  this  higher  reality.  It  has  therefore 
claimed that it was in possession of a higher organ of knowledge than is 
employed by positive science and ordinary practical experience, and that 
it is marked by a superior dignity” (Dewey, 1920:92).  
He further states that; 
“Philosophical doctrines which disagreed about virtually everything else 
were  at  one  in  the  assumption  that  their  distinctive  concern  as 
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philosophy was to search for the immutable and ultimate, that which is, 
without respect to the temporal or spatial” (Dewey, 1920:260). 
 
From these conceptions, philosophy hence earned the name: ‘mother of all disciplines’. As the 
mother, philosophy is thus expected to monitor the preoccupations of all other disciplines. But 
here comes the irony. How can philosophy pose as the mother when her preoccupations are 
totally  divergent  to  the  preoccupations  of  other  disciplines?  Where  and  how  does  the 
monitoring come into place? To put it in a more relevant religious manner – How can the man 
whose interest is nowhere but heavens, legislate over what is been done on earth? There is 
certainly no convergence. The former will remain ignorant and irrelevant to the happenings in 
the latter, and vice-versa. Perhaps, this explains the seeming irrelevance presently attached to 
philosophy. Talisse captures this submission when he writes; 
“Because  philosophers  have  traditionally  taken  themselves  to  be 
concerned with ultimate truths of the sort that could be found only in a 
transcendent, changeless realm, they have withdrawn from the world. 
Fixing  their  attention  upon  a  supposedly  superior  realm,  they  have 
abandoned  ordinary  life,  rendering  philosophy  irrelevant”  (Talisse, 
2000:28). 
and so, 
“convinced that they alone have been pursuing Truth, philosophers have 
come  to  comprise  an  elite  intellectual  class  of  thinkers  who  work  on 
exotic  and  unusual  problems,  more  correctly,  they  are  puzzles,  in 
isolation from every other intellectual endeavor (Talisse, 2000:28). 
 
The attitude described in the above quotation dates to antiquity and remains endemic among 
philosophers. Dewey characterizes the attitude in the following words; 
“The creeds that have prevailed have been founded upon the supposed 
necessity of escape from the confusion and uncertainties of experience. 
Life has been thought to be evil and hopeless unless it could be shown to 
bear within itself the assured promise of a higher reality. Philosophies of 
escape  have  also  been  philosophies  of  compensation  for  the  ills  and 
sufferings of the experienced world (Dewey, 1930:268). 
 
If this is what philosophy is all about, it then becomes hard to resist, in line with Talisse, the 
conclusion and the chorus that philosophy is a means of escape from the physical world in 
which we live (Talisse, 2000:28). But should philosophy be an escape route from the world 
around? This is the puzzle Dewey finds too tempting to avoid. For him, philosophy cannot 
remain aloof of the happening of the physical world. He seems to say that if the knowledge of 
the metaphysical world is possible, then such knowledge should proceed from the knowledge 
of  the  things  we  see  around  –  {from  known  to  unknown;  from  familiar  to  unfamiliar}. 
Philosophy must be made relevant to the world. It must make a u-turn or a paradigm shift from 
the traditional relegation to uselessness, irrelevance and redundancy. Philosophy must recover 
itself by ceasing to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a 
method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men. One remembers the 
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famous quote of that ancient Roman philosopher, Epictetus; he said – “in vain are the words of 
the philosopher that do not heal some human wound” (Akinpelu,  2005:207). Philosophers, 
according to Dewey, must henceforth turn their back to their supposed problems {problems 
which are not problems in the first instance}, and begin to turn their attention to problems 
facing the society or humanity. This paradigm shift will, thus, make philosophy relevant to us; 
other men; our environment; our world; education and all other things around us. 
 
Reconstructing Experience 
 
Another idea that is of great consequence to the whole of Dewey’s thought-pattern, especially 
as it affects education, is experience. Understanding the notion of experience, according to 
Talisse, “provides the basis for the rest of Dewey’s philosophy” (Talisse, 2000:49). It is perhaps 
the reason why experience is featured in some of the book-titles of the scholar; there are 
Experience and Education, Experience and Nature, Art and Experience, et cetera. 
 
It is, however, not an accident to have ‘experience’ preoccupying the entire gamut of Dewey’s 
philosophy; the whole of philosophical history, as a matter of fact, is preponderant of disparate 
attempts at refuting or supporting arguments around the import of experience in knowledge 
derivation. The modern epoch in philosophy gains more notoriety than any other epoch in this 
endemic  debate.  Epistemology  reached  its  crescendo  at  this  period  as  hot  debates  arose 
concerning the meaning; the nature; the forms; the sources; the possibility and the validity for 
our  knowledge  claims.  As  such,  there  appeared  questions  like:  What  is  knowledge?  Is 
knowledge the same thing as belief? How is knowledge derived? What are the sources for 
knowledge claims? Can man know anything with certainty? What criteria are used to justify or 
validate man’s claim to knowledge? Expectedly, several answers to these questions came on 
board.  The  skeptics  led  the  debate  by  out  rightly  denying  the  possibility  of  knowledge-
derivation. Man,  for them, constantly and consistently faces challenges of deception about 
existing things which drag him into perpetual doubt, to the extent that it becomes problematic 
to lay claims to knowledge for the fear of been disillusioned. It did not take long, however, 
before the Skeptic’s position was temporarily debunked. The skeptic was made to realize the 
internal contradiction in his seeming argument. For the skeptic to convince us that he was not 
sure he knew anything with certainty, he would need to convince us if he was really sure of his 
statement or position. If he was to be sure of the statement, then he would have contradicted 
himself for saying man cannot be sure of anything. If otherwise {that is, if he was not sure of the 
statement}, then, he would have made no sense at all, which is even worse than the first case. 
 
Based on the foregoing, two major schools which have dominated the whole of philosophy 
emerged: rationalism and empiricism. The rationalists affirmed the possibility of knowledge 
derivation,  and  they  sought  to  locate  its  source  within  the  mind’s  faculty  of  reason.  Rene 
Descartes, for instance, opined that experience is systematically deceptive and the source of 
illusions and errors; it is only through reason that man achieves a knowledge that is indubitable. 
Empiricists were, however, quick to debunk the position of rationalists on experience. While 
they  agree  with  the  latter  that  knowledge-derivation  is  possible,  they  reject  reason  as  its 
source. For them, reason is an abstract faculty bearing no connection with the physical world,     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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and could only supply the most trivial kind of knowledge (Talisse, 2000:33). Experience, for the 
empiricists, makes available the necessary connection between the mind and the world and is 
therefore, the source of all knowledge. John Locke, for instance, presents his case thus; 
“ Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all 
characters, without any idea; how come it to be furnished?.... To this I 
answer, in one word, Experience: In that, all our knowledge is founded 
and from that it ultimately derives itself” (Locke, 1975:104). 
 
Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Russell and other protagonists of empiricism seem to have the same 
conception of what experience is, but they differ in their association of external objects with 
man’s  mental  representation  of  such  objects;  that  is,  how  to  relate  man’s  perception,  or 
‘sensation’, or ‘feeling’ or ‘idea’ with objects existing outside there. This is the kind of dualism 
that has generated unending controversies in modern philosophy. It is the source of various 
epistemological problems. These problems, however, have thrown some empiricists, such as 
Hume, back to embrace skepticism. 
 
For Dewey, the attempt to create a dualism and thereafter, explaining the interactions between 
the dualistic concepts always instigates problems that do not worth the name - problems, and 
whose solution may never be found, as witnessed in modern epistemology. While creating a 
dualism between an inner world of sensations and an outer world of objects and then trying to 
fathom how these two supposedly separate realms are connected, certain supposed questions 
have been generated like: does my experience relate with the outside world?; are my senses 
not prone to deception?; is there any real world outside there?; can I have a representation of 
such world?, et cetera. These are some of the questions that epistemology have had to battle 
with for ages without any hope of resolution. These, for Dewey, are not problems in the first 
instance. To justify his position, Dewey starts by reconstructing the term ‘experience’ from the 
old conception. He realizes that the traditional view of experience is not empirical enough; it is 
a  theory  of  experience  that  is  not  derived  from  experience  itself.  To  understand  what 
experience is we must turn to experience itself, regires ad vontes (going back to the root). It is 
this turn that made scholars to label Dewey a radical empiricist. Talisse, for instance, describes 
Dewey’s empiricism as a “radical empirical theory of experience. It is radically empirical in that 
it derives its conception of experience from experience  itself” (Talisse, 2000:44). There are 
basically five points of contrast between the traditional conception of experience and Dewey’s 
reconstruction of the term. These points have been marshaled out by Dewey in The Need for a 
Recovery of Philosophy. They are as follow; 
 
1.  In the orthodox view, experience is regarded primarily as a knowledge-affair. But 
to the eyes not looking through ancient spectacles, it assuredly appears as an 
affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment.   
2.  According to tradition, experience as it is, is {at least primarily} a psychical thing, 
infected throughout with ‘subjectivity’. What experience suggests about itself is 
a genuinely objective world which enters into the actions and sufferings of men 
and undergoes modifications through their responses. 
 
, 
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3.  So  far  as  anything  beyond  a  bare  present  is  recognized  by  the  established 
doctrine,  the  past  exclusively  counts.  Registration  of  what  has  taken  place, 
references to precedent, is believed to be the essence of experience. Empiricism 
is conceived of as tied up to what has been, or is ‘given’. But experience in its 
vital form is experimental, an effort to change the given; it is characterized by 
projection, by reaching forward into the unknown; connection with the future is 
its salient trait. 
4.  The  empirical  tradition  is  committed  to  particularism.  Connections  and 
continuities  are  supposed  to  be  foreign  to  experience,  to  be  by-products  of 
dubious validity. An experience that is an undergoing of an environment and a 
striving for its control in new directions is pregnant with connections. 
5.  In  the  traditional  notion,  experience  and  thought  are  antithetical  terms. 
Inference, so far as it is other than a revival of what has been given in the past, 
goes  beyond  experience;  hence  it  is  either  invalid  or  else  a  measure  of 
desperation by which, using experience as a spring-board, we jump out to a 
world  of  stable  things  and  other  selves.  But  experience,  taken  free  of  the 
restrictions  imposed  by  the  older  concept,  is  full  of  inference.  There  is, 
apparently, no conscious experience without inference; reflection is native and 
constant (Talisse, 2000: 46-48). 
 
Implicitly contained  in the above comparison, is Dewey’s theory of experience. This theory 
states that experience arises from the interaction of two principles: continuity and interaction. 
The former means that all experiences are carried forward and subsequently influence future 
experiences.  This  means  that  an  experience  a  person  has  will  influence  his/her  future 
experiences, for better or for worse. Interaction on the other hand, connotes that the present 
experiences arise out of the relationship between the situation and individual’s stored past. It 
refers  to  the  situational  influence  on  one’s  experience.  Put  differently,  one’s  present 
experience is a function of the interaction between one’s past experiences and the present 
situation. Dewey thus insists that if one accepts this reconstruction of experience, one would 
then  realize  that  the  problems  which  the  traditionalists  sought  to  grapple  with  are  not 
problems, and through their  fixations with such problems, unfortunately, epistemology has 
found itself alienated from the concerns of ordinary life and thus ill-equipped to deal with the 
actual problems that inevitably arise. 
 
Evaluation 
 
Reconstruction is a name which fits the entire gamut of Dewey’s philosophical odyssey. He 
reconstructed anything reconstructible; even the society receives special attention in Dewey’s 
philosophy of reconstruction. At least, three of his books were devoted to this; they are: The 
School and Society; Democracy and Education; and Experience and Education. In these works, 
Dewey turns to philosophy as a mode of social criticism through which communities could 
revert from their entrenchment in dogmatism and authoritarianism, into a mode of associated 
life which paves way for diversity, freedom and cooperative inquiries. This is what he calls 
democracy.      International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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By and large, we painted Dewey as a philosopher of reconstruction; as a man who continually 
reconstructed even his own thinking several times in the course of his life. He was a man who 
would prefer his audience or readers to approach his work with a reconstructive mind because 
he  did  not  believe  in  fixation  of  ideas.  This  approach,  thus,  allows  Dewey’s  reader  to 
reconstruct  his  philosophy  into  an  edifice  that  satisfies  the  needs,  the  peculiarities  and 
idiosyncrasies of the reader’s place, situation, condition and time. This is indeed needed to get 
philosophy back to the stage of relevance. 
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